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NOTE

IN RE RIGHTS TO USE WATER IN THE
BIG HORN RIVER
753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988)
In 1977, the State of Wyoming initiated a suit destined to become the
first general stream adjudication involving Indian reserved water rights
completed under state jurisdiction.' In In re Rights to Use Water in the
Big Horn River [hereinafter "Big Horn"],2 decided in February 1988,
the Wyoming Supreme Court quantified the reserved water rights of the
Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes of the Wind River Reservation in northwestern Wyoming. The quantification process required the Wyoming court
to identify the purposes for which the Wind River Reservation was created. This was necessary because in Winters v. United States,3 the United
States Supreme Court held that water sufficient for reservation purposes
was reserved by implication at the same time the reservation land was
reserved from the public domain.
To determine the original purposes of the Wind River Indian Reservation, the Wyoming court analyzed the 19th century treaty which established the reservation. This analysis resulted in a determination by the
court that the reservation was established for an exclusive agricultural
purpose, contrary to the finding by the Special Master of a permanent
homeland purpose. The court consequently quantified water rights only
for activities related to agriculture, excluding water rights for mineral
and industrial development, and fisheries, wildlife, and aesthetic purposes.
The Wyoming court misidentified the purpose of the reservation first,
by strictly and incorrectly applying United States v. New Mexico,4 a United
1.Prior to 1983, uncertainty existed as to whether courts of states like Wyoming, whose enabling
acts and constitutions contain disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian lands, could adjudicate Indian
water rights. The Supreme Court in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545
(1983) held that the McCarran Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, codified at 43 U.S.C. 666 (1982), which
allows states to join the United States in general stream adjudications by waiving sovereign immunity,
removed any federal bar to state jurisdiction over Indian tribes in water adjudications which may
have existed previously by virtue of the enabling acts or federal policy. The Court also held that
whether state constitutions barred state jurisdiction over tribes in water adjudications was a matter
of state law to be determined by state courts.
2. 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), affirmed by an equally divided court, Wyoming v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989). The United States Supreme Court addressed only Question 2 of Wyoming's
petition for certiorari, No. 88-309, 109 S. Ct. 863 (1989), which concerned the appropriate standard
for quantification of the Tribes' reserved rights. The United States Supreme Court did not address
the propriety of the Wyoming Supreme Court's "purpose of the reservation" analysis.
3. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
4. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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States Supreme Court decision concerning non-Indian federal reservations, and second, by failing to apply the federal canons of Indian treaty
construction, as mandated by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe.' As the first state court to complete an adjudication of
Indian reserved water rights, the Wyoming court's analysis may encourage
other state courts to likewise misapply or ignore federal law when adjudicating Indian reserved water rights, to the detriment of tribes.
This casenote evaluates the Wyoming court's "purpose of the reservation" analysis by first describing the Winters doctrine and the federal
canons of construction which should have been but were not correctly
applied in the Big Horn decision. Next, the analysis of the Wyoming
Supreme Court is examined against this backdrop of federal law. Finally,
the legal impacts of the Big Horn decision on other Indian reservations
are considered. By way of introduction, a brief description of the history
and geography of the Wind River Reservation is provided, followed by
an explanation of the procedural history of the Big Horn adjudication.
HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC SETTING
FOR THE BIG HORN ADJUDICATION
In the early 1800s non-Indian trappers, traders, and explorers entered
the territory which later became northwestern Wyoming. These individuals developed peaceful relations with the Shoshone Indians who inhabited that region. To preserve the peace, the United States and the Shoshone
Indians entered into the First Treaty of Fort Bridget' in 1863. In that
treaty, the United States recognized a large portion of what later became
the states of Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming as "Shoshonee country." 7
"Shoshonee country" was substantially reduced in size five years later
in the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, which created the Wind River Indian
Reservation In 1878, the United States moved the Arapahoe Tribe onto
5. 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983) (when quantifying Indian water rights, "state courts, as much as
federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law").
6. 18 Stat. 685 (1863).
7. Id. at Art. IV.
8. 15 Stat. 673 (1868). In the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, "Shoshonee country" was reduced
from 44,672,000 to 3,054,182 acres. The reservation acreage was reduced further by tke 1872 Brunot
Agreement, 18 Stat. 291, Ch. 2, 1 (1874), in which the Shoshone ceded their reservation lands
located beyond the Popo Agie River to the United States. Around the turn of the century, economic
hardship compelled the Tribes to sell almost half of their reservation to the United States, in the
First and Second McLaughlin Agreements, 30 Stat. 93 (1897); 33 Stat. 1016 (1905). The United
States in turn sold some of the lands purchased from the Tribes to non-Indians for homestead,
townsite, and mineral development purposes. The Tribes retained a remnant of their original reservation which became known as the "diminished reservation."
While the Wind River Reservation boundaries contracted throughout the late 1800s, non-Indian
farming and ranching communities expanded. Many of these communities developed irrigation
projects, often with United States assistance, to deliver water to arid basins. As the non-Indian
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the Wind River Reservation, and they, along with the Shoshone Tribe
have jointly occupied the reservation since that time.
The Wind River Indian Reservation lies immediately east of the Continental Divide in northwestern Wyoming. Topographically, the reservation varies from low desert badlands to alpine peaks and valleys. 9 The
Big Horn River, as well as its tributaries, the Wind and the Popo Agie
rivers, bisect the reservation. As noted by the United States Supreme
Court, the Wind River Indian Reservation occupies the "choicest and
best-watered portion of Wyoming."" Consequently, it is not surprising
that the state of Wyoming chose to adjudicate water rights in the Big
Horn basin as soon as it obtained the authority to conduct basin-wide
adjudications.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE BIG HORN ADJUDICATION
The Wyoming Legislature authorized the state to conduct general water
rights adjudications in January 1977." Two days later, the state of Wyoming filed a complaint in a Wyoming district court commencing this
litigation, which named the United States and more than 20,000 other
water users as defendants. The United States removed the action to federal
court, claiming the state court lacked jurisdiction.' 2 The federal court
remanded, finding that state jurisdiction existed based on the McCarran
Amendment 3 and Wyoming's own statutory authorization of basin-wide
water rights adjudications. 4 On remand, the state court denied a United
States' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, allowed the Tribes to
intervene, and appointed a special master to adjudicate all water rights
in the Big Horn River system. The United States and the Tribes filed
separate water rights claims in 1980.
demand for land increased, individual Indians began renting and ultimately selling their allotted land
to non-Indian farmers and ranchers, while continuing to work their former lands as hired laborers.
In 1934, the United States reserved from non-Indian settlement all unsettled federal lands obtained
from the Tribes under the Second McLaughlin Agreement of 1905. 33 Stat. 1016. These "ceded
lands" were returned to tribal ownership as part of the Wind River Reservation by a series of
restorations beginning in 1940. Subsequently the United States acquired, on behalf of the Tribes,
additional ceded land as well as land within the diminished reservation which had passed into nonIndian ownership. Consequently, the Wind River Indian Reservation is a patchwork of lands owned
by the Tribes since aboriginal times and formally reserved for their use by the United States,
interspersed with reserved, aboriginal lands reacquired by the Tribes following a period of nonIndian ownership.
9. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 83 (Wyo. 1988).
10. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. I 11. 114 (1938).
11. Wyo. Stat. § 1-37-106 (1977).
12. See supra note 1, discussing the pre-1983 uncertainty of state court jurisdiction over the
adjudication of Indian water rights.
13. 43 U.S.C. 666 (1953). The McCarran Amendment waived the United States' sovereign
immunity with regard to comprehensive state water rights adjudications.
14. Wyo. Stat. 1-37-106 (1977).
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The Master divided the case into three phases-Indian reserved rights,
non-Indian federal reserved rights, and state water rights evidenced by
permit or certificate. 5 In December of 1982, the Special Master completed
his report concerning the Indian reserved rights claims, 6 which covered
"four years of conferences and hearings, involving more than 100 attorneys, transcripts of more than 15,000 pages and over 2,300 exhibits."' 7
The Special Master analyzed the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger and
concluded that the Wind River Reservation was created to provide a
permanent tribal homeland.'" This permanent homeland was created, according to the Special Master, so that the Tribes could, "in whatever way
most suitable to their development, establish a permanent civilization on
the Wind River Indian Reservation."' 9 Accordingly, the Master quantified
reserved rights for a broad spectrum of uses, including irrigation, stock
watering, fisheries, wildlife and aesthetics, as well as mineral, industrial,
domestic, commercial, and municipal uses.
The state district court disagreed with the Master's finding that the
Wind River Reservation was created as a permanent tribal homeland.
According to the district court, the permanent homeland language of
article IV of the Treaty of Fort Bridger functioned only to bar the Shoshone
from settling outside the Wind River Reservation.' The district court's
15. This appeal involves only the Indian reserved water rights phase. The claims made under
state law are still pending before the Special Master. Final judgment was entered on Feb. 9, 1983,
pursuant to stipulation, on the United States' reserved rights claims for Yellowstone National Park,
two national forests, and other federal reservations in the Big Horn basin. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76,
85 (Wyo. 1988).
16. T. Roncalio, Special Master, Report Concerning Reserved Water Right Claims By and On
Behalf of the Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming (Dec. 15, 1982), in Appendix
H of Wyoming's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wyoming (Aug. 19, 1988)
[hereinafter "Appendix"].
17. Big Horn, 753 P2d 76, 85 (Wyo. 1988). The Master, commenting on the delay and expense
involved in discovery alone, noted that "in my lifetime, except for the Federal anti-monopoly cases
recently dismissed or settled, and according to the memory of most counsel herein, no case in our
experience has carried so many hours and so many thousands of pages of discovery proceedings
involving unprecedented expense to parties on all sides." T. Roncalio, supra note 16, at Appendix
403a.
18. The Treaty states that the Shoshone "will make said reservations their permanent home, and
they will make no permanent settlement elsewhere; but they shall have the right to hunt on the
unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon, and so long as peace
subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of the hunting districts." 15 Stat. 673 (1868),
article IV.
19. T. Roncalio, supra note 16, at Appendix 441a-442a. In addition to finding a federal intent
to reserve water sufficient to provide a permanent tribal homeland, the master addressed several
other issues which are not discussed in this case note, such as the standard of quantification, the
Tribal right to export reserved water, the extension of the reserved right to groundwater, the effect
of the cession of land under the Second McLaughlin Agreement, priority dates of reacquired lands,
and other issues. See also, T. Roncalio, Supplemental and Final Report (June 1, 1984), at Appendix
280a, which discusses the rights of non-Indian successors in interest to Indian allottees, and owners
of expired state permits or adjudicated certificates.
20. Decision of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Wyoming, May
10, 1983 (Civil No. 4993), amended May 24, 1985 (Docket No. 101-234).
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analysis of the treaty led it to conclude that the Reservation's sole purpose
was promoting Indian agriculture; therefore, the United States intended
to reserve water solely for that purpose.2 The implied reservation of
water for agriculture was held to include sufficient water to meet related
stockwater and domestic needs, but excluded water for industrial, mineral,
municipal,. fisheries, wildlife, and aesthetic purposes.22
All parties appealed the district court decree. The Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's finding that "it was the intent at the
time to create a reservation with a sole agricultural purpose." 23 The court
found that the agricultural purpose included rights for those water uses
traditionally associated with agriculture, such as municipal, domestic,
commercial and stockwatering needs, but excluded rights for mineral,
industrial, fisheries, wildlife, and aesthetic purposes.24
THE LAW APPLIED BY THE BIG HORN COURT:
THE WINTERS DOCTRINE
The Wyoming Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress intended to
21. Art. VII of the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, 15 Stat. 673 (1868) states: "In order to insure
the civilization of the tribes entering into this treaty, the necessity of education is admitted, especially
of such of them as are or may be settled on said agricultural reservations.
...
Art. VI authorized
allotments to Indians for "farming" purposes. Articles VIII, IX, and XII offered money or agricultural
supplies as incentives to farm.
22. In addition, the district court declined to find a reserved right to groundwater and denied a
tribal right to export water off the Reservation.
23. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 96 (Wyo. 1988).
24. Id. at 98-99. The court performed a comprehensive analysis of the federal reserved rights
issues in this case, which exceeds the scope of this case note. In brief, the court first analyzed
whether the disclaimer clause, Art. 21, Sec. 26 of the Wyoming Constitution, barred state adjudication
of Indian water rights. The court held that the disclaimer clause only bars when federal law also
bars state jurisdiction. Next the court held that the United States intended to reserve water when it
created the Wind River Reservation, and that this treaty right was not abrogated by subsequent
federal actions. The United States impliedly reserved water to fulfill the agricultural purpose of the
Reservation, as quantified by the number of acres which are practicably irrigable. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The reserved right did not include groundwater and could not be
marketed off the Reservation.
The trust lands located within the diminished reservation and in the ceded portions were granted
a priority date of 1868, regardless of whether they had always remained in Indian ownership or had
passed to non-Indians and were reacquired by the Tribes. Likewise, Indian-owned fee lands which
never left Indian ownership held a priority date of 1868. The court remanded the issue of priority
dates of non-Indian successors in interest to Indian allottees, holding that they would be granted a
reserved water right with an 1868 priority date for the practicably irrigable acreage irrigated by the
Indian predecessors or irrigated within a reasonable time after acquisition by the non-Indian. Finally,
the court held that compliance with this decree would be monitored by the Wyoming State Engineer,
since federal law has not preempted state oversight of reserved water rights.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review only one issue-whether the
practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) standard of quantification was applicable in this case, where its
application would result in a reserved right to more water than was historically used on the reservation,
and where substantial state water rights on the reservation would be impacted. Wyoming v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 863 (1989). An equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Wyoming court's
decision as to the PIA issue on June 26, 1989. Wyoming V. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989).
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reserve water for the Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes to use for agriculture,
but not for traditional tribal purposes such as fisheries and wildlife, may
initially seem illogical or arbitrary. The court's result can only be understood in the context of the leading case in this area-Winters v. United
States? 5 In Winters, the United States enjoined upstream non-Indian irrigators from diverting waters of the Milk River reserved for use on the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. The United States Supreme Court held
that water was impliedly reserved from appropriation under state law by
the 1888 agreement which created the Fort Belknap Reservation.26
The Winters case turned on the construction of this agreement. The
Court found that the Gros Ventres and Assiniboin tribes, in the 1888
agreement, ceded all of their aboriginal territory to the United States
except for the portion which became the Fort Belknap Reservation. Without water, the ard reservation would have been valueless and inhospitable. 7 Since the intention of the United States was to convert the Assiniboin
and Gros Vente from nomadic hunters to farmers and ranchers, the Court
declined to interpret the 1888 agreement to support a cession of water to
the United States which the Indians required to exist as pastoral people
on the reservation. The Court explained its interpretation in this way:
By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians,
ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the
Indians. And the rule should certainly be applied to determine between two inferences, one of which would support the purpose of
the agreement and the other impair or defeat it.28
Under this rationale, the Court found an implied reservation of water
with a priority date of 1888.'
The Supreme Court has developed the Winters Doctrine considerably
25. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
26. Winters supports the related doctrines of Indian and federal reserved water rights, which can
be initially distinguished by the party doing the reserving. See Montana ex rel.
Greely v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. 76, 712 P.2d 754 (1985). The Indian reserved rights doctrine
was first articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). In

Winans, the Court held that when concluding treaties, tribes reserved all rights not expressly ceded
to the United States. See Veeder, indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water, 16 Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 631 (1971); contra Bloom, Indian "'Paramount"Rights to Water Use, 16 Rocky

Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 669 (1971). According to the federal reserved rights doctrine, the United States
may impliedly reserve unappropriated water from appropriation under state law when it creates Indian
or other reservations. See, e.g. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); United States v.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
27. 207 U.S. at 576.
28. Id. at 576-77.
29. The Supreme Court later found that individual Indian allottees had the right to share ratably
in tribal reserved waters. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939) (treaty establishing the
Crow Reservation contemplated allotment and cultivation, which required water).
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since its inception in 1908.-' The Court's "most succinct and lucid statement of the governing principles of reserved water rights"'" may be found
in Cappaertv. United States,32 a case which did not involve Indian water
rights. In Cappaert, the Court stated:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water
then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose
of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a reserved
right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art.
I, § 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and
the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation
of federal lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other
federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams.
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether
the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available
water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters are
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the reservation was
created.33
Although Cappaert addressed only non-Indian federal reservations,
these general principles apply to Indian reservations as well.34
Thus, reserved rights derive from the purpose of the reservation, which
is a question of federal law. Consequently, reserved rights are not dependent upon or governed by state substantive law. 35 Being creatures of
federal law, reserved rights need not be established or maintained by state
law requisites of appropriation and beneficial use, unlike appropriative
rights, 6 nor can reserved rights be abandoned by non-use.37 Likewise,
30. See, e.g., id.; Arizona v.California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. District Court in
and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976);
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983);
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983).
31. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 576 (1982).
32. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
33. Id. at138-39 (citations
omitted).
34. See F. Cohen, supra note 31, at 581-85 for a comparison of the reserved rights doctrine as
applied to federal and Indian lands.
35. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
128, 145 (1976).
36. F. Cohen, supra note 31, at 576, 578.
37. Id. at578.
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Winters rights are not held correlatively with other water users in a basin,
or reduced ratably during droughts, as are riparian rights. 38 Federal substantive law alone governs state adjudications of Indian reserved rights.39
Thus, courts apply federal substantive law in determining the purpose
of a federal reservation. When the reserved lands comprise an Indian
reservation, courts employ special rules to guide their interpretation of
statutes, treaties and other reserving actions. These rules are known as
canons of construction.
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION
FOR FEDERAL ACTIONS INVOLVING INDIANS
In applying the Winters Doctrine, a court adjudicating reserved water
rights must first decide the threshold issue of whether the United States
or the Indians intended to reserve water upon creation of the reservation.'
Once intent is established, the court must determine the purposes of the
reservation, for which water was impliedly reserved. To determine the
purpose, the court examines the treaty, statute, executive order, or other
action establishing the reservation, as well as the relevant legislative
history. These federal actions frequently support multiple interpretations. 4 '
Where ambiguity exists, "federal action toward Indians as expressed
in treaties, agreements, statutes, executive orders, and administrative
regulations is construed in light of the trust responsibility."4 2 Because the
United States acts as a trustee of Indian rights, courts generally presume
that federal action should be interpreted as protecting those rights.4 3 This
presumption is based in part on judicial recognition of the generally
unequal bargaining position of Indians in treaty negotiations, implied
38. Id.; Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights-Keystone of National Programs for Western Land and
Water Conservation and Utilization, 26 Mont. L. Rev. 149, 161 (1965).
39. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); Montana ex rel. Greely v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. 76, 87, 712 P.2d 754, 765 (1985); United
States v. Superior Court in and for the County of Maricopa, 144 Ariz. 265, 277, 39.22, 697 P.2d
658, 670 (1985).
40. Either the United States or the Indians may reserve water. See supra note 26. One example
of an express reservation of water by a tribe is the Treaty of 1898, 31 Stat. 672 (1898), in which
the Bannack Indians ceded the southern half of the Fort Hall Reservation to the United States. The
treaty stated that "water from streams on that portion of the reservation now sold which is necessary
for irrigating on land actually cultivated and in use shall be reserved for the Indians now using the
same, so long as said Indians remain where they now live." Id. at art. 8, quoted in Skeem v. United

States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921).
41. Where the intent is apparent from the words of a document, the legislative history, or the
surrounding circumstances, courts need not apply the canons of construction, even when the result
is detrimental to Indian interests. See, eg., DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court for the Tenth Judicial
Dist., 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S 584 (1977)
42. F. Cohen, supra note 31, at 220-21.
43. Id. at 221.
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from the United States' negotiators' superior knowledge of the English
language and American law."
Courts have refined the presumption that federal actions should be
interpreted as protecting Indian rights into three canons of construction.
These canons guide the interpretation of federal actions affecting Indians.
First, treaties must be liberally construed to favor Indians.45 Second,
ambiguous expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indians.' Third,
treaties must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them
at the time they entered the treaty.47 The canons are not limited to treaties,
but apply to other federal actions involving Indian tribes as well.4
The rules of construction are comparable to rules governing construction of adhesion contracts, which are liberally construed in favor of the
weaker party and given a layman's interpretation to meet the weaker
party's reasonable expectations.49 They are a judicial response to the
federal trust responsibility and the inequities considered to be inherent in
Indian/federal treaty negotiations.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PURPOSE OF A
RESERVATION IN A WATER RIGHTS CONTEXT
Few courts have adjudicated the purpose of an Indian or other federal
reservation in a water rights context. The United States Supreme Court
indirectly addressed this issue in Arizona v. California,"° a suit which
apportioned the waters of the Colorado River between Arizona, Colorado,
Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, the United States, and five Indian reservations.' In that case, the Supreme Court awarded the five reservations
sufficient water to meet their present and future needs. The Court found
it
impossible to believe that when [the reservations were created, Congress and the President] were unaware that most of the lands were
44. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S.
658, 675-676 (1979), modified, 444 U.S. 816 (1979); Wilkinson & Volkman, -JudicialReview of
Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long
a Time is That?, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 601 (1975).
45. E.g. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. Walker River Irrigation
Dist., 104 F. 2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939).
46. E.g. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363,
367 (1930); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
47. E.g. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832); United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 304 U.S. I11, 116 (1938).
48. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 44, at 616.
49. Id. at 617.
50. 373 U.S. 596 (1963).
51. These were the Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River, and Mohave Indian reservations.
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of the desert kind-hot, scorching sands-and that water from the
river would be essential to the life of the Indian people and to the
animals they hunted and the crops they raised.52
The Court accordingly awarded the reservations a reserved water right
measured by the amount of water necessary to irrigate all the practicably
irrigable acreage on the reservations, regardless of present needs.53 Thus,
Arizona v. Californiadictates that an Indian tribe's future, in addition to
its present, water requirements be considered by a court analyzing the

purpose of a reservation.
The Supreme Court next addressed the question of a reservation's
purpose in two cases involving non-Indian federal reserved rights: Cappaert v. United States 4 and United States v. New Mexico.5" In Cappaert,
the "implied-reservation-of water-fights doctrine . . . reserved only that
amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no
more." 56 The Court found that the presidential proclamation establishing
Devil's Hole National Monument reserved enough water to preserve the
water level in a pool comprising the only known habitat of the desert
pupfish. Since the purpose of the monument was to preserve "unusual
' including the
features of scenic, scientific, and educational interest," 57
pool, the Court held that the United States could protect its reserved right
by enjoining groundwater withdrawals outside the monument which reduced the water level in the pool."
In United States v. New Mexico,59 the Supreme Court refined its "purpose of the reservation" analysis by distinguishing between primary and
secondary purposes. The New Mexico Court held that "where water is
necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was
created," the United States intended to reserve water."o Where, however,
water was "only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation," the
United States must acquire it under state law. 6' Under this narrow rationale, the Court awarded water to the Gila National Forest for only
those purposes listed in the Organic Administration Act of 1897 6 -- timber
52. 373 U.S. at 599.
53. Id. at 600. The "reasonably foreseeable needs" standard based on estimated population growth
was rejected by the Court, which stated that "the only feasible and fair way by which reserved water
for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage." Id. at 601.
54. 426 U.S. 270 (1976).
55. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
56. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 143.
59. 438 U.S. 703 (1978).

60. Id. at 702.
61. Id.
62. 16 U.S.C. §473 et seq. (1976).
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production and watershed protection. The Court rejected reserved rights
claims for recreation, range, wildlife and fisheries purposes based on the
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960,63 stating that these were secondary uses which only broadened the scope of forest management but
did not expand reserved rights.
The Supreme Court narrowly interpreted the reserved rights doctrine
as applied to non-Indian reservations in Cappaert and New Mexico. It
effectively limited reserved rights to a non-Indian federal reservation's
minimal need. The Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether the
Cappaert and New Mexico rules apply to Indian reservations as well as
to other federal reservations. Significant differences exist between the
two,"' and for this reason, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals chose to
regard the Cappaertand New Mexico rules as guidelines alone.65
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,' the Ninth Circuit determined the purposes of the Colville Reservation in the course of resolving
a dispute between the Tribes and a non-Indian owner of formerly allotted
land. The court considered the executive order creating the Colville Reservation,6 7 as well as the "circumstances surrounding its creation, ...
the history of the Indians for whom it was created ... [and] their need
to maintain themselves under changed circumstances." ' The court applied the New Mexico test but did so liberally, considering that specific
purposes of Indian reservations were often not articulated, that the general
homeland purpose requires broad, liberal interpretation, and that reservations were created to benefit Indians, not the United States.' The Ninth
Circuit found dual primary purposes for the Colville Reservation-the
provision of a "homeland for the Indians to maintain their agrarian society" and "preservation of the tribe's access to fishing grounds." '7 It
found these purposes by broadly interpreting a one-paragraph executive
order establishing the reservation, which stated only that the reservation
would be "set apart as a reservation for said Indians." '
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit again referred to the New Mexico
63. 16 U.S.C. §528 et seq. (1976).
64. For a discussion of these differences, see Cohen, supra note 31, at 581-85; Montana ex rel.
Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 219 Mont. 76, 712 P.2d 754 (1985). In addition,
the rationale of New Mexico.-historic federal deference to state water law on federal lands-is
inapplicable to Indian reservations, where state
law is presumed not to apply.
65. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Oregon
v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
66. 647 F. 2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
67. Executive Order of July 2, 1872, reprinted in I Kappler, Indian Affairs and Treaties 916
(2d ed. 1904).
68. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 47-48.
71. Kappler, supra note 67.
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rule as simply a guideline when determining the purposes of the former
Klamath Reservation. In United States v. Adair,72 the court identified the
purposes of the reservation by analyzing "the intent of the parties to the
1864 Klamath Treaty as reflected in its text and the surrounding circumstances." 3 The court concluded from the Tribe's historical reliance on
hunting and fishing, and from treaty language which provided that the
Tribe would have exclusive on-reservation fishing and gathering rights,
that "one of the 'very purposes' of establishing the Klamath Reservation
was to secure to the Tribe a continuation of its traditional hunting and
fishing lifestyle."'74 In addition, the court found that a second purpose
was to encourage farming.75 Therefore, the court awarded reserved water
rights for both irrigation and fishery maintenance.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has consistently followed the Winters holding
that an implied reservation of water exists when necessary to support the
purposes of a reservation. When determining the reservations' purposes,
the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the canons of construction by liberally
interpreting federal actions which established those reservations. And,
recognizing the significant differences between Indian and other federal
reservations, the Ninth Circuit declared the Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the purposes of non-Indian federal reservations to be merely
guidelines with regard to Indian reservations.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Big Horn faced the same task of
determining a reservation's purpose as the Ninth Circuit faced in Walton
and Adair. The ensuing analysis evaluates the Wyoming court's findings
in light of the well-settled principles of Indian law established by the
federal courts and applied by the Ninth Circuit.
EVALUATION OF THE WYOMING COURT'S
"PURPOSE" ANALYSIS
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Big Horn affirmed the state district
court's finding that Congress created the Wind River Reservation exclusively for agricultural purposes. It rejected the Special Master's "permanent homeland" purpose, which included water for fisheries, wildlife,
aesthetics, and mineral and industrial development. The court explained
its conclusion as follows: "Considering the well-established principles of
treaty interpretation, the treaty itself, the ample evidence and testimony
addressed, and the findings of the district court, we have no difficulty
affirming the finding that it was the intent at the time to create a reservation
with a sole agricultural purpose." 76
72. United States v. Adair, 723 F2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
73. Id. at 1409.
74. Id.
75. Id.at 1410.
76. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 96 (Wyo. 1988).
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The court began its examination of the purpose issue by describing the
federal legal principles governing the analysis. It first noted that under
the New Mexico test, more than one primary reservation purpose might
be found, as the Ninth Circuit found in Walton, discussed above." The
court then stated that "the validity of the ninth circuit's application of
the New Mexico test has been drawn into question because the standards
governing non-Indian federal reserved water rights differ from those governing Indian reserved water rights."' 8 From this statement, a reader might
predict that the court would decline to apply the New Mexico and Cappaert
rules. However, this reader would be incorrect, because after listing the
canons of construction favoring tribes, the court cautioned that "we cannot
remake history"'79 and that "courts should not distort the words of a treaty
to find rights inconsistent with its language."' Consequently, the court
strictly interpreted the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger" to find an exclusive
agricultural purpose for the Wind River Reservation.
According to the court's interpretation, the only economic activity
encouraged by the treaty was agriculture. 2 In support the court cited
articles 6, 8, 9, and 12 of the treaty, which authorized allotments for
farming purposes,83 provided seeds and implements to Indian farmers,"
required the United States to pay twice as much money annually to each
Indian farmer as to each "roaming" Indian, 5 and established cash awards
for the ten best Indian farmers.8 6
77. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
78, Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 96.
79. id. at 97 (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)) (citing DeCoteau
v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425, 449 (1975)).
80. id. (citing Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 516 (1896)).
81. 15 Stat. 673 (1868).
82. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 97.
83. 15 Stat. 673 (868):
ARTICLE VI. If any individual belonging to said tribes.., shall desire to commence
farming, he shall have the privilege to select ...a tract of land within the reservation
of his tribe ... which tract ... shall cease to be held in common, but may be...
held in the exclusive possession of the person selecting it .. .so long as he ...
continue[s] to cultivate it.
84. Id.
ARTICLE VIII. When the head of a family ... shall have selected lands ... as
above directed, and ... intends in good faith to commence cultivating the soil for a
living, he shall be entitled to receive seeds and agricultural implements .... And...
such persons as commence farming shall receive instructions from the farmers herein
provided for. ..
85. Id.
ARTICLE IX. T]he sum of ten dollars shall be annually appropriated for each Indian
roaming and twenty dollars for each Indian engaged in agriculture. ...
86. Id.
ARTICLE XII. It is agreed that the sum of five hundred dollars annually, for three
years from the date when they commence to cultivate a farm, shall be expended in
presents to the ten persons of said tribe who, in the judgment of the agent, may grow
the most valuable crops for the respective year.
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The court disposed of the Special Master's identification of a permanent
homeland purpose by stating that "the reference in Article 4 to 'permanent
homeland' does nothing more than permanently set aside lands for the
Indians; it does not define the purpose of the reservation. Rather, the
purpose of the permanent-home reservation is found in Articles 6, 8, 9,
and 12 of the treaty." 8 In the Wyoming Supreme Court's view, "permanent homeland" refered to a timeframe-the concept that the treaty
reserved the Wind River Reservation permanently, for all time. It rejected
the Special Master's emphasis on the "homeland" portion of the phrase,
and looked to other sections of the treaty to identify the reservation's
purpose.
In addition to articles 6, 8, 9, and 12, the court found article 7 of the
treaty instructive. This article recognizes the importance of education to
the Indians, particularly those who chose to settle on "said agricultural
reservations." 88 The court declared that "said agricultural reservations"
applied generally to the two Indian reservations authorized by the treatythe Wind River and the Fort Hall reservations-because education was
important to all reservation Indians who were no longer "roaming." 9 It
declined to find that "said agricultural reservations" referred to the agricultural allotments which could be selected by individual Indians under
the immediately preceding section, article 6.
The court concluded that while "the treaty did not force the Indians
to become farmers and although it clearly contemplates that other activities would be permitted (hunting is mentioned in Article 4, lumbering
and milling in Article 3, roaming in Article 9), the treaty encouraged
only agriculture, and that was its primary purpose."' Therefore, if the
Tribes want to use water for a secondary purpose such as lumbering, they
must acquire new water rights under state law according to New Mexico,
or devote some reserved agricultural water rights to the secondary purpose, with the concomitant loss in water for irrigation.
The court employed a novel approach in rejecting the Special Master's
finding of a permanent homeland purpose. First, the court appears to
have incorrectly interpreted portions of a previous United States Supreme
Court case, United States v. Shoshone Tribe,9 to support its finding of a
sole agricultural purpose. Second, the court applied the New Mexico
primary purpose test, sub silentio, despite its express statement that the
87. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 97 (Wyo. 1988).
88. 15 Stat. 673 (1868):
ARTICLE VII. In order to insure the civilization of the tribes entering into this treaty,
the necessity of education is admitted, especially of such of them as are or may be
settled on said agricultural reservations....

89. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 97.
90. td.
91. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
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test may be limited to non-Indian federal reservations. It applied this test
strictly, contrary to the. Ninth Circuit view that the test is "not directly
applicable to Winters doctrine rights on Indian reservations" 92 and should
be applied liberally, if at all. 93 Finally, the court listed, but then disregarded, the federal canons of Indian treaty construction by interpreting
the treaty narrowly to favor the non-Indian position.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the reason for the establishment of the Wind River Reservation in United States v. Shoshone
Tribe." The Wyoming Supreme Court misapplied this decision in Big
Horn. In Shoshone, the Shoshone Tribe recovered compensation from
the United States because the United States had taken one half of the
reservation when it permanently located the Arapahoe Tribe on the Wind
River Reservation without the Shoshone Tribe's consent. The Court held
that the Shoshone, as beneficial owners of the reservation, were entitled
to compensation which included not only the value of the land taken, but
the value of the timber and minerals as well.
The Supreme Court placed great weight on the treaty provision setting
aside the Wind River Reservation "for the absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation of the Shoshonee Indians," 9 5 stating that when read in
context with the rest of the treaty, this provision related to "the purpose
of the arrangement made, the relation between the parties, and the settled
policy of the United States fairly to deal with Indian tribes."" The Court
concluded that the "principal purpose of the treaty was that the Shoshones
should have, and permanently dwell [on the Wind River Reservation].
To that end the United States granted and assured to the tribe peaceable
and unqualified possession of the land in perpetuity."'97
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Big Horn did not address this portion
of the Shoshone opinion requiring fair treatment and compensation for
taking the Shoshone Tribe's lands and resources. Rather, it relied exclusively on the following statement:
Provisions in aid of teaching children and of adult education in
farming, and to secure for the tribe medical and mechanical service,
to safeguard tribal and individual titles, when taken with other parts
of the treaty, plainly evidence purpose on the part of the United States
to help to create an independent permanent farming community upon
the reservation."
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408 (9th Cir. 1983).
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981).
304 U.S. It1 (1938).
15 Stat. 673 (1868), Art. 11.
Shoshone, 304 U.S. at 116.
Id.
Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 97 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Shoshone, 304 U.S. at 117-118).
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Quoting this statement alone without considering the Shoshone case as a
whole, the Big Horn court erroneously stated that the Supreme Court
found an exclusive agricultural purpose for the Wind River Reservation."
When read in context of the entire Shoshone opinion, however, this
quotation becomes a description of just one goal-the development of an
agricultural community-out of the many goals of a permanent homeland
reservation.
The Wyoming court's interpretation of the Shoshone decision leads to
the anomalous conclusion that the same treaty which granted to the Tribe
the beneficial ownership of the timber and minerals failed to reserve the
water required to develop them.'° Without water for mining and smelting,
or for lumber, pulp or paper mills, the beneficial ownership rights to
timber and minerals are considerably less valuable. This result is contrary
to Congress' intent as found in Shoshone to provide the Shoshone Tribe
with a permanent home, which by definition includes resource development, and for that reason could not have been intended at the signing
of the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger.
Next, the Wyoming Supreme Court strictly applied the New Mexico
primary purpose test as the foundation of its purpose analysis. As noted
above, the extension of this test to Indian reservations is questionable,
and the court's strict application of a questionable test is contrary to the
canons of Indian treaty construction. The court supported an agricultural
goal for the reservation by enumerating the references to agriculture in
the treaty. However, as the court itself noted, the treaty also protects the
tribal right to undertake many other activities, such as hunting, milling,
and lumbering.' The court rejected the option of finding more than one
purpose for the reservation, even though the Ninth Circuit in Walton had
done so by interpreting an executive order which was much less specific
than the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger.
Furthermore, the Wyoming court misapplied United States v. New Mexico. The New Mexico Supreme Court did not state that courts must be
restrictive when determining the purpose of a reservation, as the Wyoming
court was in Big Horn. The restrictions apply after the purposes of a nonIndian federal reservation have been identified by accepted methods of
statutory construction. New Mexico restricts reserved rights of non-Indian
federal reservations to the primary purposes. Thus, New Mexico limits
99. Big Horn, 753 F2d at 98.

100. The Tribes may choose to devote some of their reserved water quantified by the agricultural
standard to timber or minerals development, but only if they are willing to forego the ability to
irrigate a portion of their irrigable acreage. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d
42, 49 (9th Cir. 1981) (Indians permitted to allocate reserved water to uses other than the use for
which the right was quantified).
101. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 97.
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the scope of non-Indian reserved rights once the purposes are determined,
but not the methods of determining those purposes initially. The Wyoming
court confused the New Mexico holding with regard to the point in the
purpose analysis at which restrictions apply, as indicated by the court's
restrictive interpretation of the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger.
Finally, the Wyoming Supreme Court listed but apparently paid scant
attention to the federal rules of Indian treaty construction when analyzing
the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger. A liberal construction favoring the
Tribes would have encouraged the court to accord greater weight to the
many references to activities other than agriculture, the agreement of the
Shoshone to make the reservation their permanent home" °2 and their subsequent fulfillment of this promise, the establishment of the reservation
for the "absolute and undisturbed use" 03 of the Shoshone, and the United
States' promise to provide an education "to insure the civilization of the
tribes."'" These factors support a homeland purpose, and draw into
question the court's finding of an exclusive agricultural purpose in light
of the federal canons of construction which should have been applied.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, 5 construing the same treaty, stated that treaties should "not...
be interpreted narrowly.. . but are to be construed in the sense in which
naturally the Indians would understand them.'
This was especially
true, according to the Court, in situations like the Wind River Reservation
which involve "friendly and dependent Indians [who] are likely to accept
without discriminating scrutiny the terms proposed."7 The Supreme
Court in Shoshone noted that "[wihen the treaty of 1868 was made, the
tribe consisted of full-blood blanket Indians, unable to read, write, or
speak English."" °) They chose for their reservation an area "known to
contain valuable mineral deposits ...more than 400,000 acres of timber,
extensive well-grassed bench lands and fertile river valleys conveniently
irrigable."" In the'Supreme Court's estimation, the Wind River Reservation comprised the "choicest and best-watered portion of Wyoming."1°
Viewed against this backdrop, the Wyoming court's finding of a sole
agricultural purpose seems unduly narrow. The rules of construction required the court to consider the treaty from the perspective of the Shoshone
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. atart. II.
Id. atart.
VII.
304 U.S. II (1938).
Id. at116.
Id.

108. Id. at 114.

109. Id.
110. Id.
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in 1868. At a minimum, the Shoshone probably would have viewed the
document as reserving a place where they could continue to live as
independent people free from non-Indian encroachment. Agriculture would
be but one avenue to reach this goal on a reservation purposefully chosen
for its abundant and diverse natural resources. As the Supreme Court in
Winters stated:
The Indians had command of the lands and the waters,--command
of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, 'and grazing
roving herds of stock,' or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the area of their
occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate?"'

A court viewing the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger from the perspective
of the Shoshone in 1868, as federal law mandates, might have difficulty
finding that the Tribe intended to relinquish the water needed to make

the reservation productive. However, the Wyoming Supreme Court translated the question of the parties' intent when the treaty was signed into
the question of what activities the treaty encouraged as read 120 years

later." 2 The "encouragement" standard is unique to Wyoming and con-

trary to the principles of federal law state courts must apply when adjudicating Indian water rights." 3
The Wyoming Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the treaty to

find a sole agricultural purpose for the Wind River Reservation invites
speculation regarding the decision's future impact. Ironically, the court's
restrictive view of the treaty resulted in the largest reserved water right
awarded to a single reservation to date." 4 If the Wyoming Supreme Court
had instead found a permanent homeland purpose for the reservation and
accordingly granted reserved rights for fisheries, wildlife, aesthetics, in-

dustrial, and mineral development as well as agriculture, the Tribes' right
would have increased only slightly." 5 In this case, the negative impacts
I1l.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
112. Big Horn, 753 P.2d 76, 97 (Wyo. 1988) (although the treaty contemplates non-agricultural
activities, it "encouraged only agriculture, and that was its primary purpose.")
113. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983) ("State courts, as much as
federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law. Moreover, any state-court decision
alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can expect to receive, if brought for
review before this Court, a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful
federal interest in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment.")
114. The Wind River Reservation received 500,420 acre-feet annually, compared to an award of
approximately I million acre-feet divided between the five reservations whose rights were adjudicated
in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596 (1963).
115. If the court accepted the Special Master's finding of reserved rights for fisheries, wildlife,
aesthetics, minerals and industrial purposes, the award would have increased by only 17,876 acrefeet annually, plus non-consumptive rights to 60 percent of the historic flows in several streams and
lakes for wildlife and aesthetic purposes, as well as instream flows for fisheries protection. T.
Roncalio, supra note 16, at Appendix 698a-702a.
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of narrow treaty construction were mitigated by the large number of
practicably irrigable acres in tribal ownership. Separate from this result,
however, the Wyoming court ignored the federal canons of construction,
and by doing so, encouraged other state courts to follow its example.
Negative repercussions of the Big Horn decision may be felt beyond
the boundaries of Wyoming for more specific reasons. Since this was the
first state adjudication completed which quantified Indian reserved rights,
other states may find it authoritative. A strict application of the New
Mexico primary purpose test coupled with narrow treaty interpretation
could be detrimental to tribes in three circumstances.
The first involves reservations with treaty language very similar to the
Second Treaty of Fort Bridger. '6 Courts of other states may find the
Wyoming Supreme Court's treaty interpretation persuasive and follow it,
rather than do a thorough, independent analysis. Reservations with large
quantities of Indian-owned irrigable acreage may survive this narrow
interpretation relatively unscathed. But reservations with few irrigable
acres, or those whose irrigable acreage has largely passed into non-Indian
ownership may not be as fortunate as Wind River.
Even where the treaty establishing a reservation differs significantly
from the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, a state court may find support
in the Big Horn decision for a sole agricultural purpose. In this second
category, tribes who originally possessed much irrigable acreage but subsequently lost it through allotment followed by sale to non-Indians may
end up with little water." 7
The third category of tribes which may be harmed by the Big Horn
decision are those with reservations a court declares were established
solely for a purpose implying non-consumptive water uses, such as fisheries preservation. While in general tribes may allocate their water as
they see fit, regardless of the quantification standard,' the question of
whether a tribe may transfer water from a non-consumptive to a consumptive use to the detriment of a resource that water right was intended
to protect remains unresolved. Tribes whose rights are quantified for non116. See, e.g., Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche, 15 Stat. 581 (1867); Treaty with the
Cheyenne and Arapahoe, 15 Stat. 593 (1867); Treaty with the Sioux and Arapahoe, 15 Stat. 635
(1868); Treaty with the Crow, 15 Stat. 649 (1868); Treaty with the Northern Cheyenne and Northern
Arapahoe, 15 Stat. 655 (1868); Treaty with the Navajo, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
117. Ironically, non-Indian successors in interest to Indian allottees would directly compete with
Indians for water on an equal basis, since the non-Indians' rights, like the tribe's, would carry a
treaty priority date. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Andersen, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527
(1939). This scenario raises the question of who really benefits from a strict "purpose of the
reservation' analysis, despite the Ninth Circuit's reminder that reservations were created for the
benefit of Indians. Walton, 647 F.2d at 47.
118. Walton, 647 F.2d at 48 ("When the Tribe has a vested property right in reserved water, it
may use it in any lawful manner.")
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consumptive purposes alone may be precluded from diverting their water
for economic development or other consumptive uses.
CONCLUSION
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Big Horn set the stage for
future state court adjudications of Indian reserved water rights. The court's
strict application of the New Mexico primary purpose test in tandem with
its narrow interpretation of the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger departed
from accepted principles of federal law. Since the Wind River Reservation
is the only Indian reservation in Wyoming, the decision may never be
followed. However, other states faced for the first time with complex
Indian water adjudications previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts may find the Big Horn decision persuasive. If so, the
decision may herald a shift away from liberal federal treaty interpretation
in the Indian water rights context toward a more restrictive state view,
unsupported by existing Supreme Court precedent.
PEG ROGERS

